Exercise Trillium Sentry

Participant Work Book

PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1	SUBJECT GENERAL	PAGE
1.1	Introduction	1
1.2 1.3	Overview of Exercise Trillium Sentry Timetable	2
1.4	Participating Agencies	
1.5	Organizations and Responsibilities	3
1.6	Administration	6
2	SCENARIOS	
2.1	Scenario One – The G8/G20 Summit Operational Environment	7
2.2	Scenario Two – Protests	10
2.3	Scenario Three – Heat Wave	23
2.4	Scenario Four – Evacuation	29
3	DETAILED TIMETABLE	33
4	ACRONYMS	36
5	EXERCISE OBSERVATIONS	
5.1	Syndicate Observations	40
5.2	Participant Feedback Form	41

CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL

1.1 Introduction

The purpose of this document is to provide participants with the information they need for Exercise Trillium Sentry. It will provide an outline of the various scenarios and references necessary to set the scene for syndicate discussions relating to the exercise objectives and aim.

The 2010 G8/G20 Summits

During the period June 25 to 27, 2010, Canada will be hosting the 2010 G8 and G20 Summits. The G8 is a group of eight of the world's principal economic leaders including: Canada, France, United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, Japan and Italy. This annual Summit is a chance for the leaders of the G8 countries to meet face-to-face and develop common approaches to urgent challenges facing the world.

During the same time period Canada will also co-host and co-chair the first meeting of the newly mandated G20, the group that will replace the G8 as the main economic council of wealthy nations; South Korea will host the second half of 2010 G20 in November.

The security and protection requirements surrounding these events have the potential to be complex and collaboration between various law enforcement partners will be essential to ensure a successful event.

1.2 Overview of Exercise Trillium Sentry

Exercise Trillium Sentry is the first of two nationally mandated exercises developed to assist government agencies in reaching operational readiness for the secure and safe conduct of the 2010 G8/G20 Summits. The second exercise (Trillium Guardian) will be held 10-14 May 2010.

The aim of Exercise Trillium Sentry is to establish a common baseline understanding of interagency plans and procedures and their linkages for the 2010 G8/G20 Summits in Ontario.

Exercise Trillium Sentry is a Table Top Exercise (TTX) with six objectives:

1. Understand the concepts of operations, processes and procedures, and shared situational awareness to provide an integrated response to threats or emergencies or the consequences thereof during the G8/G20 Summits.

- Understand the processes for the appropriate and timely sharing and dissemination of information and intelligence across multiple jurisdictions without compromising proprietary or national security issues using the G8/G20 intelligence framework and backbone networks and mechanisms.
- Understand the Integrated Security Unit's security and public safety command, coordination and control arrangements, information sharing and decision making processes in support of the G8/G20 Summits.
- 4. Understand the plans and process for the scaled allocation of limited specialist resources, both equipment and personnel, within and across jurisdictional and operational lines, including all levels of government and between government, non-government and international organizations.
- 5. Understand the integrity of voice and data communications networks and information systems, the procedures for responding to cyber attack and the ability to operate if necessary with the temporary loss of critical networks and information systems or nodes.
- 6. Understand public communication/information plans and procedures

1.3 Timetable

The detailed timetable is shown in Chapter 3. The exercise will take place at the LCol George Taylor Denison III Armoury, 1 Yukon Lane, Toronto, ON during the period 8 to 10 December 2009. Participants are strongly encouraged to attend all portions of the exercise, including the social functions, which are intended to provide additional opportunities to exchange information.

1.4 Participating Agencies

It is anticipated that up to 380 participants from the following agencies will attend the exercise:

Integrated Security Unit (ISU) consisting of RCMP, OPP, Canadian Forces (CF), Toronto Police Services (TPS) and Peel Regional Police Services (PRPS)

Emergency Management Ontario (EMO)
Ontario Provincial Ministries

Regional and Municipal Agencies from Muskoka, Simcoe and Peel City of Toronto Agencies

Greater Toronto Airport Authority (GTAA)

Federal agencies including Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Public Safety (PS), Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), Canadian Border and Security Agency (CBSA), Department of Justice (DoJ) and others

A detailed list of participants will be available upon arrival at the exercise location.

1.5 Organizations and Responsibilities

It is intended to provide all participants with a common starting point for Exercise Trillium Sentry. Detailed descriptions of the many agencies involved in the G8/G20 Summits can be found on their respective websites.

G8 Summit Integrated Security Unit

The RCMP has created the *G8 Summit Integrated Security Unit*, which is comprised of the RCMP, the OPP, Toronto Police Service, Peel Regional Police and the Canadian Forces and other law enforcement and security experts who will work collaboratively to ensure the security and safety of the general public and heads of states attending Summits in Canada

The Summit Integrated Security Unit will work to the fullest possible extent to minimize the potential environmental impact of police security operations as well as impacts on the community and surrounding areas.

The police force of jurisdiction will assist in protecting the Internationally Protected Persons (IPP) and VIPs as well as securing the outside perimeter of the meeting sites for the guests of the Canadian government and ensuring the safety of the communities involved. Other law enforcement partners and emergency measures agencies are also part of the security measures for the summits. In addition, it will be the responsibility of the police of jurisdiction to deal with any protests outside the security perimeter established by the RCMP or disruptions such as those involving road closures.

Mandate and responsibilities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police

- General coordination of security
- Close personal protection of Heads of State and VIPs
- IPP motorcades and bodyguards

- Site security (area perimeter, airspace)
- Access control
- Federal liaison
- Operational support
- Accreditation
- Border integrity
- Liaison with federal departments
- Intelligence coordination
- Communications coordination
- Unified command with the police of jurisdiction

Mandate and responsibility of the Police of Jurisdiction

- Policing services pursuant to the Police Services Act of Ontario
- Traffic safety on affected road networks
- Crowd management
- Crime management
- To secure the outside perimeter of the meeting locations for guests of the Canadian government at the Summits
- Assistance to the RCMP upon request
- Providing specialized services where available, such as:
 - Explosive Disposal Unit
 - Canine Unit
 - Underwater Search and Rescue
 - Marine patrol
 - Obstruction Removal Team

- o Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives Team
- Law enforcement through the Public Order Unit
- Emergency Response Team
- Joint intelligence coordination
- Unified command with the RCMP
- Liaison to Provincial governments (OPP)
- Liaison to local governments (police of jurisdiction)
- To provide policing services in aid of other police forces in Ontario as may be required by the Operational Commander of the Integrated Security Unit.

Mandate and responsibility of the Canadian Forces

- To support the Government of Canada in the successful execution of the 2010 Summits
- To work in an integrated security partnership under the lead of the RCMP
- To provide unique capacities not available to security partners
- Establish an Air Component, with a main tasking to provide aerospace coordination over Summit sites and to the RCMP for the transport of Heads of State
- Providing specialized services when requested

Government of Ontario

The Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services (MCSCS) is responsible for the management of emergencies in Ontario. EMO is the overall provincial emergency management organization responsible for the promotion, development, implementation and maintenance of effective emergency management programs throughout Ontario, and for the coordination of these programs with the federal government. EMO has the responsibility to coordinate the provincial emergency response through the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC).

Ontario Provincial Ministers are responsible, through Order-in-Council (OIC) directives, for developing and maintaining applicable emergency response plans

within their assigned areas. They respond directly to emergencies as applicable and support the Provincial Emergency Response Plan (PERP).

Regional and Municipal Authorities

Regional and Municipal authorities are responsible for developing and maintaining their own emergency response plans. In the event of a crisis or emergency, they direct and coordinate the initial 1st level response, including the implementation of the emergency response plans by making use of all available regional, municipal, mutual aid, and mutual assistance resources.

1.6 Administration

Security Instructions

Exercise Trillium Sentry is an unclassified exercise. There are however, many aspects of it that would be of interest to outside entities if intercepted and could intentionally be used for nefarious purposes. All exercise documents are to be annotated with the same header and footer as shown on this document. Any classified information such as intelligence will be passed on the appropriate systems.

Participants are reminded that syndicate rooms are not cleared for classified discussions.

Exercise material is to be destroyed when no longer required.

Acronyms

Due to the diversity of organizations participating in the TTX, all participants are requested to limit the use of acronyms. When used, the full spelling should precede an acronym. Chapter 4 contains a list of acronyms that may be used on this exercise.

THIRD PARTY RULE: Do not disseminate. Contact the Author of this document for permission to release any information. Not for Legal use. This document is not to be reclassified, copied, reproduced, used in whole or part or further disseminated, without the consent of the originator. This document is the property of the G8/G20 Integrated Public Security Unit. This record may be subject to mandatory exemption under the Access to Information and Privacy Acts. If access is requested under that legislation, no decision regarding disclosure should be made without prior consultation with the departmental information and privacy coordinator of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

CHAPTER 2 – SCENARIOS

2.1 Scenario 1 – The G8/G20 Summit Operational Environment


Plenary presentations by the Summit Management Office (SMO), EMO and the ISU have provided participants with background information on the Summits and the security and safety concepts of operation. Syndicate discussion will now focus on the contribution to be made by the various organizations involved in supporting the G8/G20 Summits.


Question 1	Describe t	he following:
Question 1.	Describe t	ne ionownig.

a. W	Vhat is vour	organization's	role for the	G8/G20	Summits?
------	--------------	----------------	--------------	--------	----------

b. What are the key organizational functions that are specifically dedicated to G8/G20 Summits?

c. How does your organization's role and structure link to the Summit concept of operations as briefed earlier?





2.2 Scenario Two – Protests

Four separate sub-scenarios have been developed to compare and contrast the differences and challenges in managing peaceful protests versus violent protests in both urban and rural environments.

Protest 2A - Lawful Protest Huntsville

The G8/G20 Summits have become the focal point of a number of special interest groups seeking to gain profile and support for their cause. Protests are occurring in the Huntsville area, the City of Toronto and Ottawa, as well as in other cities.

It is now June 25th at 7:00 AM. A crowd of approximately 600 people plans to highlight the plight of the Canadian homeless, many of whom have lost employment due to the economic downturn in the Canadian economy and subsequent plant closures. This group believes that the failure of the Canadian & Ontario governments to protect the auto industry from foreign competitors especially those from South Korea and China must be highlighted during the G8 Summit. They intend to stage a peaceful protest and media event at the Huntsville Community Center at noon.

The protesters will hold a planning meeting in the parking lot of a shopping mall at 9:00 AM to discuss their plans to march to the entrance of the Summit Site during Day 1 of the Summit. The mall is located on Main St. approximately four kilometers from the Summit Site.

The protesters have established a small encampment within the Free Speech Area north of Huntsville on Golf Course Road, replete with mock wind turbines, small solar panels and tents. This group is expected to be joined by several larger groups travelling by bus from the cities of Toronto and Ottawa, which are expected to arrive by noon. One member described the group's aims: "We are about action, education and sustainability, and that's exactly what we'll be doing during the G8. We want to get the world off the track of endless economic growth that is taking us into the face of runaway climate change."

This past week Huntsville has been in the midst of a heat wave and the long range forecast calls for more of the same. The weather forecast is a high of 32° C, sunny, humidex of 40° with calm winds from the north-west. The Town has issued a heat alert that has been in effect for the past two days.

The designated official Free Speech Area is now at capacity with more protesters known to be joining within the next few hours. Facilities are currently running out of basic services such as bottled water, sanitation and space. It has been reported that there have been some heat-related casualties occurring in the Free Speech Area and that first responders from Emergency Medical Services (EMS) have experienced difficulty accessing patients due to over-crowding. Protesters from both groups consist of a mixed range of demographics from infant to elderly and male and female. A municipal worker in the Free Speech Area has also reported to have suffered serious symptoms of heat stroke.

The Huntsville District Memorial Hospital is a 76-bed community hospital with a 24-hour Emergency Department and 6-bed special care unit. It is anticipated to reach capacity by mid-day with an overwhelming number of cases of persons experiencing heat exhaustion, dehydration, heat stroke, heart attacks, asthma attacks and other respiratory conditions.


The South Muskoka Memorial Hospital is a 75-bed community hospital with a 24-hour Emergency Department located in the town of Bracebridge, approximately 25 kilometers south of Huntsville; it has begun receiving patients from the Huntsville area.

At 9:00 AM the protest gathering now numbers approximately 1000 people.

At 10:15 AM, a number of youths are observed lighting a plastic container filled with a flammable liquid on fire and throwing it off the Main St. Bridge into the river. They quickly flee the area and run into the large crowd gathered at the mall parking lot. The youths are local and known to police.

At 11:00 AM, traffic leading into the Huntsville area is beginning to build with reports of a number of frustrated drivers operating their vehicles in a dangerous manner on Hwy 11. Some have attempted to drive on the shoulder of the Highway resulting in several motor vehicle collisions that are hindering the response of emergency vehicles.

From 12:00 to 1:30 PM, protesters in the vicinity of the Huntsville Community Centre now number 1200. Some protesters throw balloons filled with orange paint against the walls of a recently constructed building. Several windows on the building are broken. For the time being the protests remain relatively peaceful with only some acts of vandalism occurring on two occasions. Traffic issues create specific logistical problems for security forces and support personnel.



Question 4. Who is responsible to plan for contingencies involving assistance for crowd control from other security forces?
Question 5. How is normal traffic flow restored?
Question 6. Which government ministries have an obligation to be concerned for the health and safety of protesters and how is their response coordinated?

Protests 2B - Lawful Protest Toronto

The long-awaited G8 Summit is underway in Huntsville. All of the key participants arrived over the past two days; the first official day of the Summit was yesterday. World leaders are currently in closed session meetings today at the Summit Site. Following the working sessions there will be a media opportunity later today; followed by an official dinner hosted by Canada.

The G8 Summit has become the focal point of a number of special interest groups seeking to gain profile and support for their cause. Protests and peaceful protests are occurring in Huntsville area, the City of Toronto, Ottawa as well as in other cities. Protest organizers have called for larger protests today.

It is now Saturday 26 June at 11:00 AM. The weather in Toronto and Huntsville remains hot and humid. The City of Toronto has issued a heat alert that has been in effect for the past two days.

The protesters are from a wide demographic background, consisting of a range of ages from infant to elderly, male and female, family groupings, and various ethnic groupings. Some known members of street gangs are present.

Several Free Speech Areas have been established in the city, including Nathan Phillips Square in front of City Hall and Queens Park in front of the Provincial Legislature. There is significant domestic and international media interest in the protests. Television camera teams are at both main protest locations and are broadcasting live. Many of the young, technically savvy protesters are downloading podcasts of the action and sharing them with their friends.

The two principal protest sites are now at capacity with facilities currently running out of basic services such as water, sanitation and space. More protesters are anticipated to arrive within the next few hours. The protests are, however, largely peaceful. New protesters and curious members of the public are arriving at the main protest sites by subway, street car and bus.

Toronto Police Services are satisfied with the way in which the protests are developing. The protesters, as a rule, are not causing any major problems. The crowd in Nathan Phillips Square, the larger of the two Free Speech Areas, is chanting anti-globalization slogans and a couple of bands are spontaneously entertaining the crowd with music. A number of protesters have stripped and are cavorting about in the Square's fountain and reflecting pool.

At Queen's Park the large group is milling around the south-end of the park in front of the Legislature building. The crowd is spreading out onto Queen's Park Crescent down to College Street. Some traffic has been affected and the police have had to clear the roadway. The crowd is good natured and making lots of noise. However, the hot weather is beginning to take its toll and some of the protesters are being affected by the high temperature and subsequent dehydration.

It has been reported that there are some heat-related casualties occurring in both Free Speech Areas and that the first responders (EMS) are having difficulty accessing patients due to crowding. Hospitals and clinics are beginning to be overwhelmed with emergency cases of dehydration, heat exhaustion, heat stroke, heart attacks, and patients with respiratory conditions such as asthma.

Question 1. Your superior has requested you to provide an analysis of the situation that is developing in downtown Toronto. She wants to know:

a. What is the command and control and liaison structure that is established between affected security agencies for the Summit-specific model and how does it differ from normal operations?

b. How does information flow between agencies and within agencies?

c. How is this information shared with and within the Summit UCC?

Question 2. How does intelligence flow between agencies and within agencies?

Question 3. Public Affairs and Communications are important aspects of managing the flow of information during large, significant public events:a. Who declares and communicates the status of the protest; lawful, unlawful, and/or Summit specific?

b. What are some of the elements of the overall strategic communications approach?

c. How would a coordinated communications plan/strategy be developed?

d. What messaging, related to the protest, should be used?

e.	How would messages be synchronized?
f.	Who would be the lead spokesperson?
g.	What is the most appropriate communications strategy to deal with this protest?
	ion 4. Logistics are an important aspect of handling public protests: What logistics support could/should be provided to this protest?
b.	How does the peaceful protest affect traffic?
C.	Will reassignment of security resources be required?

<u>Protests 2C – Unlawful Protest Toronto</u>

You are back in Toronto and it is now 1:30 PM (Saturday 26 June). The protests that started out so peacefully are continuing but there are signs that all is not well. About an hour ago the large protest group at Queen's Park, estimated at 2000 protesters, started to move south on University Avenue. As the mass of protesters moved past the Royal Canadian Military Institute someone threw rocks at the venerable institution breaking windows. The throng is moving towards Nathan Phillips Square.

The 3500-strong crowd at Nathan Phillips Square is getting larger as the mass from Queen's Park converges on the Square. There are reports that there are other smaller protests occurring in other venues near the lakefront and at sites around the downtown core. A group estimated to be about 200 strong is milling around the base of the CN Tour. Another group of about 100 or so is reported to be in First Canadian Public Park adjacent to the Toronto Stock Exchange. They are noisily protesting against globalization and are making threats against the seat of Canadian capitalism. Another group is reported to be gathering and blocking traffic in the area of Yonge Street and Front Street. A small group of protesters has appeared wearing balaclavas and face scarves. A small but noisy group is in the area of Queen's Quay. Other protesters are in the vicinity of on-ramps of the Gardiner Expressway near Yonge Street. It appears that some of the protesters are using the PATH underground system to move quickly from place to place.

These changes in the nature of the crowds and the fact that they appear to be targeting specific sites does not bode well for security forces. The convergence on identifiable, high-profile buildings and venues as well as the appearance of protesters who are concealing their identity indicate that events are transitioning from lawful to unlawful protest.

Question 1. The transition of the nature of the protests will force decisions to be made by the ACC and UCC; as a staff officer or a member of the security force considering the new situation, answer the following questions:

a. What actions are anticipated as a result of the transition from peaceful to violent protest?

b.	What is the command and control and liaison structure that is established between affected security agencies for the Summit-specific model and how does it differ from normal operations?
C.	How does information flow between agencies and within agencies?
d.	How is this information shared with and within the Summit UCC?
e.	What are the decision parameters and the decision-making process used to determine when a protest begins to adversely affect peace and order?
ı <u>est</u> elliç	ion 2. As a result of the change from a peaceful to violent protest does the gence flow between agencies and within agencies change?

Question 3. As a result of the change from a peaceful to violent protest:

a.	Has the public communication messaging, related to the protest, changed?
b.	Who declares and communicates the status of the protest; lawful, unlawful, and/or Summit specific?
C.	Who would be lead spokesperson?
d.	What is the most appropriate communications strategy now to deal with this violent protest?

Protests 2D - Unlawful Protest Huntsville

It is now Friday June 25th at 2:00 PM. The two main groups of protesters in the Huntsville area have now grown to over 5500 people in total in and around the downtown core. The major staging area where both groups are beginning to converge is the area of Main St. directly in front of a mall parking lot. They decide that they will march together to the Summit Site. The distance to be covered along Hwy 60 east is approximately four kilometres and should take just over one hour. At this point there have been several acts of vandalism to the Huntsville Community Centre and the front windows of several stores have been smashed. Three women protesters were knocked to the ground by the rapid movement of a segment of the crowd. Some protesters are experiencing the effects of the extreme heat and many have fainted or suffered from heat-related illness. The South Muskoka Memorial Hospital is now filled to capacity.

The protest has transitioned from peaceful to violent; the crowd is approaching the outer security perimeter, thus threatening the Summit Site. The march up Highway 60 creates specific logistical problems for security forces and support personnel.

<u>Question 1</u>. With protesters now moving towards the Summit Site, who controls the response and consequence management of the protest? Which other Site-security entities are involved at this stage? To what extent?

Question 2. Who has the responsibility for facilitating dialogue with the protest leaders?

Question 3. As a result of the change from a peaceful to violent protest:

a.	Has the public communication messaging, related to the protest, changed?
b.	Who declares and communicates the status of the protest; lawful, unlawful, and/or Summit specific?
c.	Who would be lead spokesperson?
d.	What is the most appropriate communications strategy now to deal with this violent protest?

2.3 Scenario 3 – Heat Wave

Eastern Canada has been experiencing an unusually hot and dry period for this time of year. The winter had little snow cover, the spring was unusually warm with little run-off due to the lack of winter snow cover, and we are currently experiencing a heat wave. The long range forecast calls for more of the same.

The current weather is: 30° C. The forecast high is 32° C, sunny, humidex of 40° C with calm winds from the north-west.

The City of Toronto has issued an Extreme Heat Alert that has been in effect for the past two days. Many other cities, towns and district municipalities involved in the area of the G8/G20 Summits have also issued heat alerts, including the District of Muskoka.

Free Speech Areas have been established and are now at capacity with facilities currently running out of basic services, water, sanitation and space. Additional protesters are anticipated to arrive within the next few hours. It has been reported that there are some heat-related casualties occurring in the Free Speech Areas and that first responders (EMS) are having difficulty accessing patients due to crowding.

The protesters represent a wide range of interests and causes. They are made up of mixed demographics consisting of a range of ages from infant to elderly, male and female, family groupings, various ethnic groupings and some members of known street gangs are present.

Hospitals and clinics are being overwhelmed with heat exhaustion, dehydration, heat stroke, heart attacks, asthma conditions, etc. The electricity infrastructure is experiencing brown-outs and in some areas of southern Ontario some regional blackouts.

Exacerbated by forest dryness, several large forest fires are being fought in northern Ontario and north-western Quebec. Smoke from these fires has been picked up in the upper atmosphere and has drifted over the area adding to the smog and degrading air quality conditions. Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) has these fires under control but ground and air firefighting resources have been engaged for a prolonged period.

The operational situation has security forces continuing their mission with the full intention of completing assigned tasks despite the heat wave conditions — this is a "no-fail" mission. The lift capabilities of some helicopters (RCMP, CF) have been slightly affected due to the heat

<u>Question 1</u>. The prolonged heat wave will have effects on security personnel, support personnel and their performance to some degree:

a.	How could the heat wave affect security operations?
b.	How would you address hydration, health and heat protection issues for
-	curity forces especially for those deployed in small teams and/or in open
_	What are your agency's reporting policies and obligations on injuries duty (security elements, including any civilians involved in security tions) and the plan for replacing these personnel?

uesti	on 2. Effective media relations are important to reassuring the public:
a.	What kind of messaging should be issued regarding the heat wave especially as it relates to the G8/G20 activities? By which agency? And who would coordinate the messaging?
b.	How will media considerations be integrated into planning?
	on 3. Health issues concern not just security forces but also supporting nts and the public at large that can affect the health resources available:
a.	Who would co-ordinate shelters and from where would temporary medical shelters be resourced? Would security forces be implicated?
b.	How would authorities manage the strain on health facilities?

C.	Movement of numerous heat-related casualties could become difficult. How could this be mitigated?
	ion 4. Food will spoil during a heat wave. This could involve G8/G20 Sites, ty forces, the local population and protesters.
a.	What impact could this have on security operations?
b.	Who are the lead and supporting agencies?

<u>Question 5</u>. Heat can affect some critical infrastructure that could directly or indirectly affect security operations and their support:

a.	What infrastructure could be affected by the heat wave that would impact on the security operation?
b.	What impact could brown-outs or black-outs have on infrastructure including local transportation? What are some mitigating strategies?
C.	How could this affect security operations and personnel? How could it be mitigated? Which authorities would be involved?

Question 6. The forest fire situation could have an impact on the G8 Summit. While it is true that a direct threat would probably result in the relocation of the Huntsville Summit, the decision to relocate would not be an easy one considering the potential cost, impact on security and the very important political dimension. Consider the situation if a forest fire is initiated on Crown land by a lightning strike in a heavily forested area north-west of Deerhurst a few days prior to the G8 Summit.

uati	on if a forest fire is initiated on Crown land by a lightning strike in a heavily ed area north-west of Deerhurst a few days prior to the G8 Summit.
a.	What departments, ministries, agencies and authorities could be involved and who would be the overall coordinator?
b.	How could Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) respond to this? What resources are available across the province, i.e. personnel, water bombers, equipment and what mutual support agreements or arrangements are in place with other authorities?
C.	If policing resources would be required in the affected area and nearby communities, how could the OPP respond to this situation without affecting security operations for the Summit?
d.	What action would the ISU take? Could Summit-committed resources be

- d. What action would the ISU take? Could Summit-committed resources be redeployed to support external situations? And if so, how?
- e. If relocation of the Summit was deemed necessary, what would be some of the related planning considerations?

2.4 Scenario 4 – Evacuation

It is Saturday 26 June at 10:45 pm. Weather is very warm (28° C, humidex 35, wind calm from NE). A large Toronto hotel houses level 3 International Protected Persons (IPP), local (short-term) residents and security personnel. There is a local Command Post in the hotel and security personnel are controlling access on the various floors occupied by delegations.

Earlier in the evening, an explosion occurred in a high-voltage vault in the basement of the hotel. The explosion has destroyed the containment vault and ignited a fire that precipitated a decision to evacuate the hotel. The explosion and subsequent fire have shattered some windows on the two lower floors, crumbled the loading dock, and knocked out power inside the building. Emergency backup power for internal evacuation routes was restored in a matter of seconds with viability assured for approximately 90 minutes; however the fire burned out of control for two hours.

Smoke and soot from the fire quickly infiltrated the main air circulation system. Potentially toxic fumes generated by the fire infiltrated the majority of the occupied floors of the hotel. Hyper responsiveness, due to inhalation of smoke particles from large quantities of smoke greatly increased the risk of incidences of respiratory failure and acute respiratory distress syndrome. As this was a hydro-electrical vault burning, it is assumed that some level of polychlorinated biphenyls were present, posing a threat to human health and life.

Hotel staff has initiated their rudimentary fire drill procedures and they have only been able to account for less than 50% of all non-Summit residents that they assume were present at the time of the fire alarm. The City of Toronto fire department has several downtown stations fully equipped to handle high rise fires. The evening the fire occurred, public and private transportation networks that provide access to downtown were free of obstacles and other major problems.

Media outlets have been reporting from approximately 15 minutes after the hotel staff initiated 911 calls.


Key internal players are the senior fire, TPS, EMS, and Office of the Fire Marshall, Medical Officer of Health, Hydro/Gas and the G20 Site Commander.

Key external players include more than 75-80 firefighters who responded to the fire scene with 14 fire trucks; several Toronto City police vehicle patrols and EMS ambulances also responded. It is a five-alarm fire.

Two IPP (one male and one female) and three other national delegates were casualties and they have been evacuated to St. Michael's Hospital trauma emergency unit awaiting medical assessment. At least one national delegate has reported


concerns about sensitive diplomatic documents that are unaccounted for at the present time.

At 11:20 PM, the Site Commander sent his second situational report stating that all IPP have been accounted for including the two casualties and their host nation security personnel. Security of the area designated for IPPs and their national delegates has been compromised and all security resources assigned to the building are now deployed.



THIRD PARTY RULE: Do not disseminate. Contact the Author of this document for permission to release any information. Not for Legal use. This document is not to be reclassified, copied, reproduced, used in whole or part or further disseminated, without the consent of the originator. This document is the property of the G8/G20 Integrated Public Security Unit. This record may be subject to mandatory exemption under the Access to Information and Privacy Acts. If access is requested under that legislation, no decision regarding disclosure should be made without prior consultation with the departmental information and privacy coordinator of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

level? What can he/she speak to?



	Does the security detail hand over responsibility for the hotel site to first If so, how do they reassume responsibility?
	Explain how the alternate site plan is implemented and what must be ior to executing this plan?
THIRD PARTY RULE: Do r	not disseminate. Contact the Author of this document for permission to release any information. Not for Legal use. This document is not to be

CHAPTER 3

EX TRILLIUM SENTRY – DETAILED TIMETABLE

Tuesday 8 December 2009

Time	Location	Activity
0730-0830	Gymnasium	Registration
0830-0845	Gymnasium	Introductory Remarks Mr. Ward Elcock - Coordinator for the Olympics and G8 Security
0845-1000	Gymnasium	Briefings - Scenario 1: The G8/G20 Operational Environment • 0845-0900 Exercise Briefing • 0900-0915 Summit Management Office • 0915-0930 Safety • 0930-1000 Security
1000-1045	Gymnasium	Coffee
1045-1200	Syndicate Rooms	Syndicate Orientation and start discussion of Scenario 1
1200-1300	WO & Sgts' Mess	Lunch
1300-1500	Syndicate Rooms	Continue discussion of Scenario 1
1300-1500	JROC 3 rd Floor	Syndicate 7 – CANSOF brief and discussion (Classified, Invitation Only)
1500-1600	Gymnasium	Plenary Session: Scenario 1
1600-1800	Officers' Mess	Exercise Meet and Greet
1800	Denison Armoury	Departure

Wednesday 9 December 2009

Time	Location	Activity
0730-1030	Syndicate Rooms	Scenario 2: Protests
1030-1100	Gymnasium	Coffee
1100-1200	Gymnasium	Plenary Session: Scenario 2
1200-1300	WO & Sgts' Mess	Lunch
1300-1530	Syndicate Rooms	Scenario 3: Heat Wave
1300-1600	Third Floor	Syndicate 7 : Summit Intelligence Architecture (Classified, Invitation Only)
1530-1630	Gymnasium	Plenary Session: Scenario 3
1630-1730	Officers' Mess	Informal Social Gathering and Discussion
1730	Denison Armoury	Departure

Thursday 10 December 2009

Time	Location	Activity
0730-0930	Syndicate Rooms	Scenario 4: Evacuation
0930-1000	Syndicate Rooms	Syndicate Exercise Summary
1000-1045	Gymnasium	Coffee
1045-1130	Gymnasium	Plenary Session: Scenario 4
1130-1200	Gymnasium	Closing Remarks
1200	Denison Armoury	Departure (lunch available)

CHAPTER 4 – ACRONYMS

Acronyms	Definition
2iC	Second in Command
A/COMM AAR AC ACC ACC ACIIS ACK ACL ACM ACP ADM ALEA APEOC ASOCC	Assistant Commissioner After Action Report Assistant Commissioner Air Component Command Area Command Centre Automated Criminal Intelligence and Information System Acknowledgement Access Control List Airspace Control Measures Access Control Point Assistant Deputy Minister Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies Alternate Provincial Emergency Operations Centre Air Security Operations Coordination Centre
ВСР	Business Continuity Plan
C2 CANUTEC CATSA CAZ CBRNE CBSA CCEM CCIRC CCRU CEMC CF CM COOP	Command and Control Canadian Transport Emergency Centre (a TC ops centre responsible for transportation of dangerous substances) Canadian Air Transport Security Authority Controlled Access Zone Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive Canadian Border and Security Agency Cabinet Committee on Emergency Management Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre Community Crisis Response Units Community Emergency Management Coordinator Canadian Forces Consequence Management Continuity of Operations
CONOPS CPIC CPX	Concept of Operations Canadian Police Information Control Command Post Exercise

Acronyms	Definition
CRCS CSIS	Canadian Red Cross Society Canadian Security and Intelligence Services
D/CROPS DCSR DEOC DFAIT DND DO DOC DOC DOJ DM	Deputy Criminal Operations Officer Daily Consolidated Situation Report Division (or Detachment) Emergency Operation Centre Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Department of National Defence Duty Officer Department Operations Centre Duty Operations Chief Department of Justice Deputy Minister
EDBM EDTS EMC EMS EMU EOC EZ	Exercise Developmental Background Material RCMP Explosives Disposal Technology Section Emergency Management Committee (ADM level) Event Management System Emergency Management Unit Emergency Operations Centre Exclusion Zone
FAQ FCG FERP FSA	Frequently Asked Questions Federal Coordination Group Federal Emergency Response Plan Free Speech Area
G8 GOC GTAA	Group of Eight Industrialized States Government Operation Centre Greater Toronto Airport Authority
HC HIRA HP HRVA HAZMAT	Health Canada Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Health Portfolio (HC, PHAC & EOC) Hazard Risk and Vulnerability Analysis Hazardous Materials Team
IC ICP	Industry Canada Incident Command Post

Acronyms	Definition
IMS INAC IPP ISU ITAC IZ	Incident Management System Indian and Northern Affairs Canada Internationally Protected Persons Integrated Security Unit Integrated Threat Assessment Centre Interdiction Zone
JCBRNT JIG JRCC JTFC	National Joint RCMP CBRN Response Team Joint Intelligence Group Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (CF) Joint Task Force Central
MAA MAA MAG MCSCS MCSS MEI MEOC MERP MGS MNDMF MMAH MMC MNR MOE MOHLTC MOL MRL MTO MSOC	Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs Mutual Aid Agreement Ministry Action Group Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services Ministry of Community and Social Services Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure Ministry Emergency Operations Centre Ministry Emergency Response Plan Ministry of Government Services Ministry of Northern Development, Mines and Forestry Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing Main Media Centre Ministry of Natural Resources Ministry of Environment Ministry of Health and Long Term Care Ministry of Labour Media Response Lines Ministry of Transportation Maritime Security Operations Centre
NESS NGO NOC	National Emergency Stockpile System Non-Governmental Organization National Operations Centre
OFM OIC OMAFRA	Office of the Ontario Fire Marshal Order in Council Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs

Acronyms	Definition
OPP	Ontario Provincial Police
OPP OPS	Operational Planning Process Ontario Public Service
010	Chiano i ablic corvice
PDAT	Provincial Disaster Assessment Team
PEOC PERP	Provincial Emergency Operations Centre Provincial Emergency Response Plan
PHAC	Public Health Agency Canada
PHSA PIA	Provincial Health Service Authority Pearson International Airport
POTUS	President of the United States
PRPS	Peel Regional Police Services
PS	Public Safety
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SAC SAR	Security Advisory Committee (DM level) Search and Rescue
SMO	Summit Management Office
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SZ	Surveillance Zone
TACC	Toronto Area Command Centre
TC	Transport Canada
TPS TRA	Toronto Police Services Threat Risk Assessment
UCC	Unified Command Centre
ZULU	Greenwich Mean Time
20L0	Oreenwich Mean Time

CHAPTER 5 – EXERCISE OBSERVATIONS

5.1 Syndicate Observations

The intent of the Syndicate Observation Report is to record the major conclusions reached during syndicate deliberations. Some of these conclusions will be raised in the plenary sessions, but the Syndicate Observation Report will ensure a more complete record of syndicate work. Syndicate Scribes will record key elements of the discussion but will not attempt to produce a complete record of discussion. This report should be focused on matters related to Summit operations, logistics, and other such matters although comments on the effectiveness of the exercise itself should also be recorded. Conclusions reached will be useful for all organizations during their preparation for the Summits and aspects will undoubtedly be incorporated into the next exercise.

5.2 Participant Feedback Form

Constructive feedback is very important in evaluating the relative success of the exercise and in preparing for future exercises. A participant feedback form has been enclosed to ensure that everyone has a chance to provide their views, especially if they haven't been captured in the Syndicate Observation Report. It is requested that the feedback form be filled in periodically throughout the exercise and be returned to your Syndicate Scribe prior to the end of the exercise.

THIRD PARTY RULE: Do not disseminate. Contact the Author of this document for permission to release any information. Not for Legal use. This document is not to be reclassified, copied, reproduced, used in whole or part or further disseminated, without the consent of the originator. This document is the property of the G8/G20 Integrated Public Security Unit. This record may be subject to mandatory exemption under the Access to Information and Privacy Acts. If access is requested under that legislation, no decision regarding disclosure should be made without prior consultation with the departmental information and privacy coordinator of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Participant Feedback

Please complete the form below (use the back if you need more space) and leave it with your Scribe upon completion.

Which organization do you represent?	
Indicate your impression of the scenarios training on future exercises.	s, with emphasis on areas that were not covered to your satisfaction or that require additional
The G8/G20 Summit Operational Environment	
Protests	
Heat Wave	
Evacuation	
What problems, concerns or issues would you recommend be exercised during Ex TRILLIUM GUARDIAN?	
Other Issues of concern to you or your Department.	